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Abstract
Helsinki and Barcelona are particularly interesting cases for the study of the 
challenges associated with present-day multilingualism, due to their combining 
a well-entrenched endogenous patrimony of linguistic diversity, together with 
the politics this patrimony has entailed, with new layers of exogenous linguis-
tic differentiation introduced by recent waves of immigration. As a result, the 
linguistic cleavages of the past intermingle in intricate ways with the imprint of 
the new heterogeneity. The assessment of the politics of multilingualism in the 
two cities demonstrates, on the one hand, how the national is “transnational-
ized” due to the new cultural and communicative practices introduced by im-
migrant groups. On the other hand, the politics of multilingualism is a politics 
that nationalizes the transnational: although the “hybridization” that is often 
associated with the dynamics of immigration may well change the parameters 
of identity politics, it apparently does not entail the waning of all cultural identi-
ties in a cosmopolitan pastiche of sorts. The analysis presented leads to the 
normative conclusion that the recognition of linguistic identities plays a key role 
in linking the dynamics of complex diversity and citizenization. By just political 
standards, cities concerned with how to confront a diverse citizenry should 
open up to introduce varying combinations of a multilingual repertoire at the 
level of their institutions.
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1 Introduction: multilingualism and the city
When social scientists analyze cultural heterogeneity in the context 
of cities, they generally do not devote a great amount of space to 
dealing with the effects language diversity and multilingualism have 
specifically in urban areas. Richard Sennett (1991: 133–141), to 
mention one prominent example, presents a poignant critique of 
Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of the urban public sphere, 
arguing that Arendt’s view of the role of the public is so emphatically 
abstract and impersonal that it fails to keep in touch with the proper 
realm of the social. In the end, Sennett observes, it is hard to see 
how different people – strangers – would be able to communicate 
at all in the philosopher’s ideal city. Taking this into account, it 
must be considered paradoxical that neither does Sennett make a 
proper attempt at grasping the challenges that are involved in man-
aging linguistic diversity so that a characteristically urban “culture of 
difference” can be institutionalized. Peter Marcuse (2002: 12), to give 
a second example, outlines a historical approach to the “partitioned 
city” which does include language in its account of cultural cleavages 
that may be relevant for studying urban politics. Yet, in this case too, 
language is only mentioned in passing, and there is no discussion of 
the possible connections between the linguistic and the functional or 
status-related divisions that are typical of partitioned cities.
 In view of the tendency to abstract from the linguistic dimen-
sions of an urban setting largely characterized by diversity, the great 
American sociolinguist Joshua A. Fishman (1997: 347) has per-
spicuously compared language in New York City to an “overlooked 
elephant at the zoo”. In accordance with the perspective adopted by 
Fishman, the thesis advanced in this contribution is that linguistic 
diversity is becoming an increasingly salient issue on the agenda 
of urban politics and policies in Western societies, at least in the 
European context. Thus, both political and urban sociologists, as 
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well as scholars working in the field of ethnic relations and migration 
studies, are well advised to study the phenomenon more extensively. 
At the same time, it seems obvious that a thorough normative as-
sessment of the implications of identity politics, including the politics 
of linguistic identity, requires detailed analyses of the “micro” dimen-
sions of political integration in contexts marked by deep cultural 
diversity. In most cases, these dimensions find their clearest expres-
sion at the level of cities. The approach to the analysis of language 
politics sketched out on the following pages is hence based on two 
main assumptions. First, the use of language in urban settings can 
be taken as a telling indicator of sweeping processes of social and 
political change. Second, in European cities, at present, linguistic 
differentiation is a topic that deserves specific research efforts on its 
own right, as it raises important empirical and normative questions.1
2 The multilingual city, European  
nation-states, and the new heterogeneity
European modernity was substantially defined by the emergence 
and consolidation of the political model of the nation-state, a model 
characterized, according to Charles Tilly (1994: 25), by “centralized 
organization, direct rule, uniform field administration, circumscrip-
tion of resources within the territory, and expanded control over 
cultural practices.” Parallel to the unfolding of national forms of rule, 
the processes of population structuring that shaped Europe during 
the last five centuries involved a continuous push towards cultural 
homogenization. If we leave aside the presence of new immigrant mi-
norities for a moment, many European states today apparently offer 
a rather homogeneous image in terms of their cultural profile. To a 
large extent, this homogeneity is a manufactured homogeneity, which 
is the result of institutional strategies designed and implemented 
by political authorities (Mann 2005). Almost everywhere in Europe, 
enforced assimilation and population transfers, not to mention more 
aggressive measures, played an important role in the process of 
state-making. Generally speaking, since the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648), the long-term historical trend was to create uniformity within 
the different units composing the European state system, even if 
one of the main reasons for the establishment of the system was the 
necessity to come to grips with the new differentiation of Christianity 
after a protracted period of religious wars. This differentiation was 
therefore taken as a key criterion for delineating borders between 
states. Thus, the generalization of national forms of rule can be 
considered to be one of the most salient features of Europe’s path 
to modernity, and this generalization often became synonymous with 
cultural homogenization.
 Cities played a crucial role in this process. In Stein Rokkan’s 
well-known model of the territorial structuring of Europe, the initial 
sequences of nation-state making, which led to the political control 
and cultural standardization of a given territory by the ruler, widely 
overlap with the dynamics of center formation (Rokkan 1999). In the 
paradigmatic cases, the rise of the European nation-state presup-
posed the existence of an urban center acting as the driving force 
of dynastic expansion and concentrating economic and coercive 
resources. At the same time, the standards to be adopted in the 
territories controlled by the center reflected the cultural patterns that 
had become hegemonic at the center itself, including a linguistic 
standard. As the symbolism of their historical architecture still reveals 
today, European capitals such as Paris, London, or Stockholm for a 
long period literally embodied the cultural identities of the nations 
they claimed to represent, and constituted the unchallenged focal 
points of linguistically integrated spaces of public communication. In 
virtually all larger territorial states in Western Europe, the history of 
the metropolis was inextricably linked to the history of one national 
community, whose members shared a particular set of cultural at-
tributes and spoke the same language.
 The tempestuous expansion of national forms of rule towards 
the East, where the political scene until World War I was character-
ized by the continuity of imperial powers such as Habsburg or tsarist 
Russia, made the homogenizing impact of the modern structuring of 
Europe’s populations and territories more dramatically visible than in 
the longue durée of nation-state formation in the West. The cultural 
and linguistic map of Central and Eastern Europe was traditionally 
more mixed and patchwork-like than in the Western half of the conti-
nent. Thus, the main urban centers of the multinational empires also 
remained permeated by a strong pluralism of languages and ethnici-
ties well into modern times. In his portrait of late 18th century Vienna, 
the Bavarian traveler Johann Pezzl expresses his amazement by the 
“mixture of so many nations” and the resulting “linguistic confusion 
(Sprachenverwirrung)” that in his view were distinctive features of the 
imperial capital, when compared to other places in Europe. Pezzl’s 
account includes the following “national” and “linguistic” groups: 
“Hungarians, Moravians, Transylvanians, Styrians, Tyrolians, Dutch, 
Italians, Frenchmen, Bavarians, Swabians, Silesians, Rhinelanders, 
Swiss, Westphalians, Lothringians etc. etc.” (quoted after 
Therborn 1995: 53).
 The homogenizing force involved in the breakdown of old 
multinational empires and in the making of new nation-states can 
be grasped through the figures collected by Göran Therborn (see 
Table 1). Therborn refers to ethnic identities, yet in most cases these 
identities also include a particular linguistic dimension. Some of the 
evidence listed in the table may be questionable. For instance, in 
the case of Helsinki, a city still under tsarist rule in 1890, the use 
of the “national ethnicity” label cannot ultimately exclude the bulk of 
Swedish speakers, who were as loyal to the Finnish nation as the 
their Finnish speaking fellow citizens captured by the figure. Vilnius 
was in 1926 a city clearly marked by two larger communities: Polish 
speakers and Jews. Yet it is hard to believe that at that moment no 
Lithuanians at all were living in what today is the capital of Lithuania. 
In other cases, such as Bucharest, Prague, and Sofia, the reliability 
of the statistical evidence we have at hand for the 19th century may 
be rather limited. Nonetheless, the table does give an excellent first 
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approximation to a cultural map that would be radically altered during 
the first five decades of the 20th century.
 When looking at the figures, one should keep in mind that 
they do not only depict the situation at the aggregate level. Often 
enough, the multilingualism of Eastern Europe’s administrative and 
commercial centers found its reflection in individual biographies as 
well. We may think of writers such as Edith Södergran, a Swedish 
speaking Finn brought up in St. Petersburg, who wrote her first 
verses in German, before she produced her highly praised poetry 
in Swedish. Another famous case in point is Elias Canetti, an author 
with a Spanish – Sephardic family background, raised in a Bulgarian 
border town where he received his main instruction in German, the 
language he kept on using in his prose after escaping from the Nazis 
and moving from Vienna to London.
 As Therborn (1995: 47) has put it, the long-running process 
of ethnic and cultural homogenization in Europe reached its peak 
around 1950. The price paid in Central and Eastern Europe for 
approaching a standard thought of as “normal” in the West was 
particularly high. The paths to nation-state construction implied 
intense conflicts, frequent boundary changes, ethnic cleansing, and 
the expulsion of substantial segments of the former population of 
several countries. The holocaust perpetrated against the European 
Jews by the Nazis retains an extreme and singular character in a 
historical context marked by an obsessive and often violent striving 
for homogeneity.
 With hindsight, if we face the long-term results, the success 
story of the European nation-state, a story referring to a mode of rule 
that combined the goals of territorial integration and cultural stan-
dardization, may be regarded to some extent a myth (as Charles Tilly 
(1992) has argued). Moreover, in contrast with former times, diversity 
has nowadays become a pivotal normative reference in the official 
discourse of European integration: it is revealing, in this respect, 
that the official motto of the European Union (EU) reads United in 
diversity. It is hard to deny, however, that cultural homogenization 
represented one of the dominant paradigms of European modernity, 
and was an objective pursued by state makers and nation builders all 
over the continent. If we focus on the city level, it should be noted that 
only a few of Europe’s capitals and metropolitan centers are officially 
multilingual, with this multilingualism being generally restricted to no 
more than two languages. I will take this point up in more detail in the 
next sections.
 Against the background sketched out so far, the changes 
Europe has been experiencing during the last decades appear to 
be quite far-reaching. A secular trend has been reversed, especially 
if we consider the situation in West European cities. Here, the influx 
of migrants both from Europe’s peripheries and from other conti-
nents has reintroduced heterogeneity. This is largely reflected in 
the profound sociolinguistic transformation of many urban settings. 
At present, the picture is additionally complicated by the powerful 
expansion of English as a regular means of communication at the 
higher levels of society. Thus, in many cities, English is displacing 
the local vernacular in elite-dominated contexts. It may not be too 
much of an exaggeration to compare this new heterogeneity to 
former manifestations of cultural and linguistic diversity, which were 
characteristic of medieval towns and survived into the first half of the 
20th century in many areas of the European East. In the big cities of 
Western Europe, the patterns of stratification and of linguistic differ-
entiation tend to overlap again, at least when we look at the two ends 
of the social spectrum. The upper segments of the staff employed 
by transnational corporations, IT experts, bankers, as well as people 
working in research centers or universities often use English as their 
regular medium of communication. At the other end of the scale, we 
find the bulk of the immigrants from North Africa, South Asia, Turkey, 
and other regions of the globe, who continue to use their mother 
tongues, thereby giving languages such as Arabic or Turkish a signifi-
cant weight on Western Europe’s sociolinguistic scene. A trend often 
observed with a good amount of concern by the members of the local 
middle class is pointing towards a future that seems to come pretty 
close to our past.2 Apparently, the “new medievalism” – a concept in-
troduced by social scientists who want to highlight the consequences 
of the successive uncoupling of territoriality, political control, and 
cultural identity we are currently experiencing – is leaving some of 
its most immediate traces in the sociolinguistic configuration of our 
urban spaces.
 It is an open empirical question whether, regarding the second 
and third generation of migrants and the influx of new migrating 
groups, tendencies that work towards linguistic assimilation will pre-
vail, or if language maintenance will turn out to be the rule and lead 
to a long-term stabilization of multilingual structures. The interplay of 
the dynamics of international migration with the cultural hegemony 
Table 1. Early modern share of current titular nation of the population 
of East European capitals
City Year % Total population
Bratislava 1910 38
Bucharest 1850 c. 40
Budapest 1870 46
Chisinau 1926 40





Prague 1846 < 36
Riga 1913 42
St. Petersburg 1910 89
Sofia 1866 c. 33
Tallinn 1871 52
Vienna 1910 85
Vilnius 1926 0 (?)
Warsaw 1897 62
Zagreb 1910 75
Source: Therborn (1995: 44).
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attained by global English implies that the particular features of the 
local linguistic context will be a critical factor in shaping future devel-
opments. Thus, it may be plausible to hypothesize that the potential 
for the assimilationist pull of English in London will be stronger than 
the hegemonic capacity of, say, Swedish in Stockholm.3 Generally 
speaking, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the new het-
erogeneity will leave a long-lasting imprint on the cultural landscape 
of most European cities. Such an assumption can be based both on 
structural grounds and on normative considerations.
 On the structural side, the spread of new telecommunications 
and information technologies plays a central role. The availability of 
these technologies has created a broad range of new possibilities for 
sustaining collective identities on a non-territorial basis. Again, the 
most manifest cultural effects of a sweeping transformation can be 
witnessed in cities. In places like Berlin or Brussels it is no problem to 
receive several TV stations broadcasting, for instance, in Turkish via 
satellite or through the cable network. At the same time, even if the 
dominance of the English language in cyberspace is unquestioned, 
the Internet seems to offer smaller and dispersed language groups 
a solid infrastructure for creating new communicative networks that 
are templates for reproducing particular cultural identities across long 
distances. To the extent that they have become part of the emerg-
ing global informational society, European cities may experience a 
flourishing of “virtual ethnic communities” (Elkins 1997), of communi-
ties that will remain attached to their specific languages. In addition 
to virtual mobility, recent forms of migration also seem to imply an 
intensification of the real physical mobility of persons in time and 
space, thus entailing an intensification of direct interactions within 
collectivities dispersed across state borders and world regions. In the 
end, structural developments of this kind are contributing to a phe-
nomenon well analyzed both by experts on migration and by social 
anthropologists: urban spaces are successively being transnational-
ized and integrated in the communication flows linking countries of 
origin to countries of destination.4 This “transnationalization” has an 
evident linguistic component (Vertovec 2009: 70–72).
 On the normative side, the main argument to be made is that 
pretensions to strive for a quick and complete linguistic assimilation 
of immigrant groups have lost much of the political appeal they may 
have had in former times. In the recent past, international organiza-
tions such as the UN and UNESCO have put great emphasis on 
securing an independent status for cultural rights, including linguistic 
rights, as a necessary complement to the civil, political, economic, 
and social categories of human rights. The impact of the new dis-
course on rights and recognition has been remarkably strong in many 
Western societies, where issues concerning the material dimensions 
of citizenship have become closely connected with questions related 
to the field of symbolic representation and cultural identity (Pakulski 
1997). European institutions defining transnational rights standards 
for the European Union, the Council of Europe, or the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe have played a pioneering role 
with regard to this. It is true that the main targets of the regulating 
activities of these institutions have thus far been autochthonous 
groups that are entitled to be considered as regional or national mi-
norities. Yet it appears to be increasingly difficult to draw a clear-cut 
demarcation line between the claims of collectivities of this kind and 
the claims of migrant groups who have become firmly established 
in their host countries. Accordingly, the cultural rights discourse is 
swiftly spilling over from old to new minorities, and Europe is facing 
a growing pressure to include migrants in its transnational minority 
rights regime.
 Another significant element in this normative constellation is 
EU citizenship. It has an increasing importance for the regulation 
of education and schooling in the member states. In the context of 
intra-European mobility, EU member states are supposed to make 
concessions towards the protection of the linguistic and cultural 
identity of citizens who move across borders. From a normative per-
spective, then, to draw a discriminatory line between the children of 
EU citizens and the children of citizens from non-EU countries when 
the local school curriculum is adapted to the challenges of the new 
heterogeneity is a problematic strategy. At the same time, it is obvi-
ous that the right to preserve one’s cultural identity and to maintain 
one’s mother tongue has its most immediate institutional relevance in 
those urban zones where migrants are typically concentrated.
3 Urban multilingualism and its challenges:  
the examples of Helsinki and Barcelona
Let me flesh out the general argument put forward so far with two 
empirical examples. They cannot obviously be taken as evidence 
that has been gathered following systematic criteria, nor allowing 
us to draw general conclusions. What they do provide, though, is a 
basic illustration of the problems related with urban multilingualism 
in Europe today. The topic under scrutiny certainly deserves a good 
deal of detailed comparative research. Accordingly, the issues that 
are going to be addressed in an exploratory way on the following 
pages might offer some hints for developing a more general focus 
of analysis, in spite of their being inserted in specific local settings.
 Barcelona and Helsinki belong to the small group of European 
capital cities that stand in striking contrast to the general trend diag-
nosed by Therborn. They resisted the push of homogenization and 
retained a multilingual profile that is a part of their institutional reality. 
This means that they are de jure and de facto bilingual cities, the two 
languages officially in use being Castilian (Spanish) and Catalan in 
the case of Barcelona; or Finnish and Swedish in the case of Helsinki.
 Among the larger West European cities with more than 500,000 
inhabitants, only Brussels (institutionally bilingual in Dutch and 
French) and Dublin (Irish and English) have similar characteristics to 
Helsinki and Barcelona. In Dublin, however, the presence of Irish in 
everyday life has to a great extent a symbolic, basically de jure char-
acter. In practice, the city largely functions in English. I will also leave 
Brussels aside in my discussion of urban multilingualism. Although it 
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would make sense to compare the Belgian capital to the other two 
cases in terms of its main socio-linguistic attributes, Brussels is differ-
ent from Barcelona and Helsinki in two important respects: First, the 
massive influx of foreign population dates back to the 1960s, while the 
Mediterranean city and its Baltic counterpart only have registered a 
significant increase of immigration from abroad since 1995. Second, 
Brussels has unique characteristics as the semi-official capital of the 
European Union, as it hosts a substantial portion of a foreign popula-
tion who belong to the trans-European elite, an attribute for which 
there is no proper correspondence in Barcelona and Helsinki.5
 To get back to our starting point, Helsinki and Barcelona appear 
to be particularly interesting laboratories for the study of the chal-
lenges connected with present-day multilingualism, because of their 
combining of a well-entrenched endogenous patrimony of linguistic 
diversity, together with the politics this patrimony has entailed, with 
new layers of exogenous linguistic differentiation introduced by recent 
waves of immigration. Both cities are also subject to the impact of 
Europeanization, an impact that on the communicative side becomes 
palpable with the continuous spread of English as a trans-European 
lingua franca, which is being more frequently used not only at the 
level of high business, research, and academic networks, but also 
in service sectors such as tourism and commerce. We can thereby 
assume that in both Helsinki and Barcelona the linguistic cleavages 
of the past intermingle in intricate ways with the imprint of the new 
heterogeneity. Let me now offer a rough first assessment of how this 
happens.
4 Helsinki
As the capital of Finland, Helsinki is the center of an officially bilingual 
country. This official bilingualism finds its foremost expression in 
public institutions, which are formally committed to functioning both 
in Swedish and in Finnish. In practice, this commitment is to a great 
extent regulated in correspondence with the number of citizens 
assigned to a language group at the local level. The respective 
figures follow the registered linguistic census data. Municipalities 
can be unilingual in either of the two languages, bilingual with 
Finnish as majority language, or bilingual with Swedish as majority 
language. Language provisions vary accordingly. Helsinki, with a 
substantial minority of Swedish speakers, is a bilingual municipality 
(Oikeusministeriö 2009).
 The language question is linked in intricate ways with the history 
of Finnish nationalism. After independence (1917), the co-official sta-
tus of Swedish was for some time contested by the more radical wing 
of the Fennoman movement, but in the 1930s a consensus emerged, 
which has endured into the 21st century.6 As a national language 
with a constitutional standing equal to Finnish, Swedish has been 
able to maintain such a high profile in schools, the state adminis-
tration, and the public media that the Swedish-speaking Finns are 
often portrayed as a generously protected group by all comparative 
European standards. At the same time, however, linguistic census 
data show that the proportion of Swedish speakers has been declin-
ing since independence: while in 1920, the group comprised 11.0% 
of the Finnish population, the figure had gone down to 5.4% in 2009 
(McRae 1999: 86). 7
 The trend is even more palpable in Helsinki, a city that was more 
or less evenly bilingual around 1900, if we recall the evidence offered 
by Therborn (1995: 44). Five decades later, in 1950, this picture had 
already changed substantially, with a percentage of Swedish speak-
ers at 19.0%. For 1980, the figure was 10.6%, and in 2010 it had 
dropped to 6.0%.8 To explain this decline would require a thorough 
sociolinguistic analysis, which cannot be offered here. In a nutshell, 
the language dynamics in the capital are in line with the overall dy-
namics at the national level. The key point to be made in this context 
is that Finnish nationalism effectively succeeded in overcoming a 
situation of diglossia, in which Swedish was the language of “higher” 
communication, while Finnish was used in “lower” functional domains 
(Kraus 2008: 103–104). Laponce (1987: 33–42) has made the point 
that a non-diglossic bilingualism – that is, a bilingualism character-
ized by an equal social status of the two languages involved – tends 
to be unstable if language communities coexist within the same 
territory, ultimately giving way to a generalized dominance of the (de-
mographically) stronger language. This is what basically happened 
in Helsinki in the course of the 20th century. Thus, one may conclude 
that even a very generous level of protection of a minority language 
is no automatic guarantee for the language’s long-term reproduction.
 On the Swedish-speaking side, there have thus far not been 
many signs of discontent about the loss of demographic weight of 
Swedish in the capital area. The issue has an intricate character. On 
the one hand, the gradual supersession of the Swedish language 
by Finnish entails consequences for Swedish politics in Finland. 
Traditionally, the Svenska Folkpartiet (SFP: Swedish People’s 
Party), which acts as the main ethnolinguistic representative of the 
interests of the Finland Swedes, gets the bulk (that is around 70%) 
of its vote from Swedish-speaking citizens (McRae 1999: 192–194).9 
Accordingly, the relative decrease in the number of Swedish-
speaking population poses an obvious threat for the political future of 
the SFP. On the other hand, in a system firmly dominated by the logic 
of consensus (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002: 285), the SFP has been 
able to play a significant role in decision-making both at the national 
and at the local levels. In legal terms, the frame of language policy 
is highly institutionalized, so that, all in all, Swedish does maintain a 
significant presence in public settings. In a bilingual municipality such 
as Helsinki, for instance, institutional bilingualism implies that there 
exists a full-fledged Swedish school circuit parallel to the Finnish one. 
To re-politicize the language issue against the background of demo-
graphic trends therefore entails an obvious risk from the Swedish 
angle, as it might lead to a general reassessment through which an 
officially national language might ultimately be declared a minority 
language. Since 1945, at the latest, the main rationale for language 
policies in Finland has been to avoid any exacerbation of linguistic 
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strife by defining the country’s linguistic diversity as a key element 
of national identity. Up to now, state institutions tend to embrace 
multilingualism as a positive feature of Finnish society, as a feature 
that contributes to giving Finland a competitive advantage vis-à-vis 
linguistically poorer environments. Against this background, we may 
define the Finnish approach towards linguistic diversity, which is 
also the approach adopted in the Helsinki area, as an integrative 
multilingualism.
 What are the implications of integrative multilingualism when it 
comes to immigration? Finland only became a country of immigration 
in the 1990s, and even after that turning point Finnish immigration 
figures have remained low, compared to those of most other West 
European countries. The number of foreigners registered in Finland 
in 2010 was 167,954, equating to 3.1% of the total population.10 At 
the same time, immigration is largely an urban phenomenon. It is 
concentrated south of the axis between Tampere and Turku, the 
capital area in and around Helsinki attracting a substantial portion 
of the foreign population. Thus, in 2010, 7.2% of the people living in 
Helsinki were foreigners. To get a fuller picture, one has to add the 
Finnish citizens born abroad to this figure. Overall, then, the speak-
ers of non-domestic languages among the inhabitants of Helsinki at 
present make for 10.2% of the city population (Helsingin kaupungin 
tietokeskus 2010: 1, 6).
 Around 150 languages are nowadays spoken in the Finnish 
capital. Most of the language groups are small, with only three 
languages breaking the threshold of 5,000 speakers. Among these 
three, the 13,000 Russian speakers constitute by far the largest 
language community. Russian is spoken by twice as many people as 
Estonian and Somali, the languages of the next two larger linguistic 
communities on the list of non-official language groups. In the case of 
Russian and Estonian, we are dealing with languages whose “home 
territories” are in close geographical proximity to the Helsinki area. 
It seems safe to assume that mother tongue use among Russian- 
and Estonian-speaking immigrants is supported by the dense 
trans-border networks that exist between Helsinki, St. Petersburg, 
and Tallinn. The structures of migrant transnationalism that connect 
these locations have an obvious linguistic dimension and certainly 
contribute to the maintenance of Russian and Estonian in the capital 
of Finland.11
 So do the local authorities, whose tendency is to apply the 
approach of integrative multilingualism with regard to the concerns 
of immigrant communities. On the website of the City of Helsinki’s 
Education Department, one finds a clear commitment to multicultur-
alism,12 which may seem surprising enough in view of the general 
multiculturalist backlash that has been experienced all over Europe 
in the last decade.13 While the Department emphasizes the impor-
tance of the acquisition of Finnish from the preparatory level, it also 
highlights its will to support the mother tongue skills of immigrant 
children. The support explicitly aims at mother tongue retention. 
With this purpose, schools provide two hours of complementary (i.e. 
extra-curricular) maintenance language instruction per week, which 
are financed by the municipality. To organize a group of pupils that re-
ceive instruction of their own language, a quorum of four participants 
is required. On this basis, as the Education Department is eager to 
point out, approximately 4,000 school children of immigrant origin 
received mother tongue instruction in Helsinki in 2010. About 40 
languages were taught in the corresponding programmes, the largest 
language groups being Russian, Somali, and Estonian. The list of 
languages taught as maintenance language also includes Bengali, 
Uyghur, and two variants of Kurdish (Soran and Kurmanji).
 By comparative European standards, the Helsinki approach 
to mother tongue instruction is exceptionally generous. It implies, 
at least in theory, that even at the level of comprehensive schools 
children have the option to leave school equipped with four lan-
guages: Finnish; Swedish, which is compulsory as the other national 
language; English; and, finally, their mother tongue.14 This is a clear 
break with the principles of linguistic homogenization associated 
with the making of nation-states in Europe, as well as a departure 
from the agenda of assimilationism, at any rate in its linguistic form. 
One should not exaggerate the point: the dominance of Finnish in 
everyday communication in Helsinki remains unchallenged. At the 
same time, while Swedish retains its public presence, the weight of 
Russian as an immigrant language has grown considerably. Against 
this background, it is worth noting that English is playing an increas-
ingly significant role as the lingua franca allowing for communication 
between different language groups. Moreover, it is gaining additional 
strength due to the ongoing “Anglicization” observable at the level of 
the institutions of higher education, as well as of the work routines of 
international firms.
 Paradoxically, the recent dynamics may be undermining the 
very basis from which the approach of an integrative multilingualism 
once emerged, namely the consensus on conceiving of Finland as 
of a bilingual political community. At any rate, in the urban setting 
of Helsinki, a setting that is of great importance for symbolically 
displaying the cohabitation of the two national languages, Swedish is 
to some extent being displaced by larger immigrant languages, such 
as Russian, and by English, which is becoming the standard lingua 
franca when Finns communicate with citizens of neighboring Nordic 
countries. The fact that the bulk of immigrant children in the Helsinki 
area experience their linguistic immersion in the host society through 
the Finnish-speaking school circuit puts additional demographic 
pressure on Swedish. It is in this convoluted situation that language 
is re-emerging as a salient political issue. Over the last couple of 
years, the question of whether Swedish should maintain its status as 
a national language, to be acquired at least at some basic knowledge 
level by all Finnish citizens irrespective of the linguistic composition 
of their area of residence, has become the subject of intense debates 
in the media (Saukkonen 2011). Parallel to this development, the 
populist True Finns party has begun to put more effort into reinvigo-
rating the Fennoman cause, turning “compulsory Swedish”15 into one 
of the main targets of their campaign against what they perceive as 
alien to the “Finnish soul” and to “Finnish values”. A long tradition of 
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institutional openness towards multilingualism is thereby exposed to 
risk of being eroded by the pressures of a resentful and ethnocentric 
identity politics.
5 Barcelona
In political terms, the main difference between the two cities under 
scrutiny here is that Helsinki is the capital of a sovereign state, 
whereas Barcelona “only” hosts the governmental institutions of 
Catalonia. In the European press, Catalonia is often categorized as 
a “region”, and this is also the status it is assigned in the institutional 
context of the EU, where it is one of the, at present, 344 members 
of the Committee of the Regions. The majority of Catalan citizens, 
however, tend to conceive of their country as a nation, albeit a state-
less one. Since 1980, Catalonia has the status of an Autonomous 
Community within the semi-federal structures of the Spanish state. 
In similar ways as the Scots or the Quebeckers, many Catalans aim 
at higher quotas of sovereignty, which are to be conquered either by 
obtaining additional space for self-government from Madrid, or by 
means of achieving independence.16 Meanwhile, as an Autonomous 
Community provided with a substantial portion of devolved powers, 
Catalonia holds significant competences in the field of language 
policy, the main constraint to these lying in the fact that the Spanish 
constitution defines Castilian as the official language in the whole 
of Spain’s territory, other languages – that is, Basque, Catalan, and 
Galician – being given the option of sharing a co-official status with 
Spanish in the Autonomous Communities where they are spoken. 
Thus, as Finland, Catalonia has two official languages, Catalan and 
Castilian/Spanish.
 Since the re-establishment of Catalonia’s autonomy after the 
end of the Franco dictatorship, the co-official status of Catalan has re-
currently been a matter of political disputes. As the Catalan language 
was publicly banned and prosecuted by Spanish authorities for much 
of the 20th century, and underwent a long period of intense repres-
sion after the end of the Civil War and the conquest of Catalonia by 
Franco’s troops, the institutions of the Generalitat – as the Catalan 
government is officially called – have put (and continue to put) major 
efforts into improving its sociolinguistic standing. The autonomy provi-
sions define Catalan as Catalonia’s “own” language, thereby giving it 
a symbolically somewhat higher position than Spanish (Kraus 2007: 
208). Whereas broadly accepted in Catalonia itself, this approach 
has generated some animosity on the Spanish side, especially (but 
not exclusively) on the right wing of the political spectrum, where 
there is concern about the questioning of the hegemonic status which 
the Castilian language has enjoyed for centuries all over Spain by 
mobilized peripheries with distinct linguistic features, such as the 
Basque Country and Catalonia.17
 In practice, the own language formula has meant, for instance, 
that the regular language of instruction in most subject areas at 
Catalan schools is Catalan. At the same time, the schools have to 
make sure that all students achieve the same levels of competence 
in Castilian as in the Catalan language. Catalonia thereby applies 
a different model than Finland, where educational institutions are 
differentiated according to linguistic criteria. In contrast with Finnish, 
Castilian has a long record as a dominant language. The philoso-
phy of Catalan language immersion programs has therefore been 
grounded on the premise that establishing a more balanced bilin-
gualism in Catalonia requires special institutional support for Catalan 
(Balcells 1996: 189–190), a support given according to the logic of 
“positive discrimination”. In this respect, one can summarize that the 
forces of Catalanism – a term which is used here for denominating 
those actors, not necessarily all nationalists, who are supportive 
of the Catalan cause – aim at achieving an objective that was also 
prominent among Finns several decades ago, namely at overcom-
ing a situation of diglossia that they consider unfair, as it entails an 
inequality of linguistic status between Spanish and Catalan.
 Throughout the last decades, the language issue in Catalonia 
has been characterized by an extraordinarily high level of politiciza-
tion. The parameters of language conflict are more intricate than in 
Finland, as “internal” factors interact with “external” ones. On the 
internal side, there is a remarkably strong consensus, shared by 
the bulk of the political parties represented in the Parliament of the 
Autonomous Community, on the priority of giving Catalan special 
protection, not least because of the structurally weaker position it 
has had vis-à-vis Spanish. On the external side, this view collides 
with the approach generally adopted by Spanish decision-makers in 
Madrid, who are not prepared to accept what they perceive to be a 
relegation of Castilian to a secondary role (Kraus 2007: 211–214). 
What ultimately explains the salience of linguistic issues in the 
Catalan context is that language occupies an important space on 
the battleground of two competing – and, as it actually seems, to 
some extent incompatible – nation-building projects: the objective of 
reframing Spain as one nation after the Franco dictatorship is chal-
lenged by Catalan aspirations for higher quotas of sovereignty. In 
consequence, language policies in Catalonia are largely determined 
by a context of conflictual multilingualism.
 How does this conflictual multilingualism impact on the linguistic 
scenery in the city of Barcelona? In contrast with Finland, there are no 
proper census data on the linguistic identity of citizens in Catalonia. 
The political regulation of language issues is based on the assump-
tion that bilingualism applies evenly over the Catalan territory. Still, 
language competence and language use have been scrutinized in 
numerous studies and surveys undertaken in autonomous Catalonia 
over the last three decades. As a comprehensive survey from 2008 
shows, Catalan is the first language of 31.6% of the population of 
Catalonia older than 15 years; for Castilian, the corresponding figure 
is 55.0%.18 When it comes to linguistic competence, according to 
the same survey, 94.6% understand Catalan, 78.3% speak it, and 
61.8% can write it; for Castilian, the figures approach 100% for the 
first two competence levels, the writing competence being 95.6% 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 139, 142). It has to be noted that 
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writing proficiency in Catalan increases considerably among younger 
age cohorts, as school instruction of Catalan was banned for most of 
the Franco period, but became successively normalized after 1975. 
Moreover, interestingly enough, there is no strict coincidence be-
tween the proportions of what people indicate as their “first language” 
and their “language of identification”: thus, 46.5% give Castilian as 
their language of identification, 37.2% Catalan, 8.8% both Catalan 
and Castilian, 2.4% Arabic, and 4.3% other languages (Generalitat 
de Catalunya 2009: 48).
 When we focus on the metropolitan area of Barcelona, 
the figures do not deviate massively from Catalonia as a whole, 
although Castilian is stronger in the capital than in rural areas. In 
Barcelona, 24.7% indicate Catalan as their first language; the figure 
for Castilian is 63.1% (both Catalan and Castilian: 4.2%; Arabic: 
1.8%; other languages: 5.5%). With regard to competence, 94.6% 
of the metropolitan population understand Catalan, 78.3% speak it, 
and 61.8% write it (Castilian: 100.0%; 99.9%; 96.7%) (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2009: 45, 139, 142).19 The survey data demonstrate that, 
at the aggregate level, bilingualism has a more balanced profile in the 
conurbation of Barcelona than it has in Helsinki. Moreover, the use of 
two languages in everyday communication is an extended practice at 
the individual level too (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 57–82).
 What can be said in terms of a first attempt at assessing how the 
“endogenous” patterns of bilingualism interact with the multilingualism 
introduced by immigration in Barcelona? Two aspects of immigration 
stand out in comparison with Helsinki. First, one has to be aware of 
the sheer quantitative dimensions of the phenomenon: from January 
2001 to January 2010, the number of foreigners in Barcelona went 
up from 74,019 (4.9% of the total population) to 284,632 (17.6%). 
Evidently, the impact of immigration on the city’s demography has 
been massive. Second, if we look at the data for 2010, immigrants 
from Central and South America comprise 40.7% of the city’s foreign 
population.20 The vast majority of these immigrants have Spanish as 
their first language, so that there is a significant overlap between 
“old” and “new” varieties of multilingualism in the Catalan capital. In 
difference to Helsinki, there is no immediate information about the 
linguistic affiliations of the city’s residents available for Barcelona. 
Still, the ranking of foreign nationals does offer some indirect 
evidence on the languages of the immigrant communities, and in 
view of the relative strength of citizens from North Africa and from 
Pakistan among the foreign population, one can conclude that Arabic 
and Urdu carry special weight in Barcelona’s changed multilingual 
setting (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2010: 116). Otherwise, the linguistic 
composition of the immigrant universe is as manifold as in Helsinki.
 To assess the institutional response to the new multilingual-
ism, we have to keep in mind that Barcelona differs from Helsinki 
in one very important respect: whereas in Finland, education and 
schooling are to a great extent a municipal matter, in Catalonia it is 
the Generalitat that holds key competences in the field of education. 
Thus, how multilingualism is regulated in the schools of Barcelona 
follows substantially from policies designed by the Department 
of Education of the Catalan government. Yet, at the same time, 
the principles endorsed by this Department in its approach toward 
mother tongue instruction come very close to what we find at the 
local level in Helsinki. In general terms, the Departament d’Educació 
embraces multiculturalism and multilingualism as the appropriate 
means for creating positive models of coexistence for an increasingly 
diverse citizenry. In addition, great emphasis is placed on linking the 
sensitivity towards difference and the rejection of linguistic prejudice 
with the aim of achieving social cohesion.21 Another specific aspect 
of the approach developed for tackling multilingualism in Catalan 
schools is the explicit support shown for minority languages: when 
depicting the linguistic situation in the countries of origin of immigrant 
children, such as Morocco or Bolivia, special and extensive mention 
is made of Berber and Quechua. This may be taken as a statement of 
intent based on the Catalans’ own experience as a linguistic minority. 
To some extent, one might venture, the context of conflictual multi-
lingualism reverberates in the field of organizing immigrant mother 
tongue instruction.
 Against this background, similarly to all Catalan schools, the 
schools in Barcelona are also encouraged to offer extracurricular 
classes in foreign pupils’ languages and cultures of origin both at 
the primary and at the compulsory secondary level. However, a key 
difference with Helsinki is that the institutional input, as defined in 
the regulations formulated by the Departament d’Educació, does 
not include the supply and the remuneration of teaching staff, but is 
essentially limited to providing school locations. The financial funds 
for mother tongue instruction have to come from other (non-public) 
institutions or bodies. As a result, the scope of mother tongue in-
struction thus far remains modest. On an Education Department web 
page containing information about mother tongue instruction in the 
school period 2010–2011, we learn that nine languages have been 
on offer for extracurricular classes. The number of pupils in these 
classes totals 2,952.22 It has to be noted that the figure is for the 
whole of Catalonia. There is no breakdown for the municipal level. 
Hence, given that in Catalonia, in contrast with Finland, immigration 
has affected the rural areas as heavily as the urban ones, we can 
extrapolate that the figure for Barcelona must be significantly lower.23 
The obvious conclusion is that Barcelona lags clearly behind Helsinki 
when it comes to setting up and implementing mother tongue reten-
tion programmes. The importance that is given to the fostering of an 
extensive multilingualism in official discourses is thus far not really 
matched by material efforts.
 On the other hand, and, again, somewhat paradoxically, the 
salience of language conflict may contribute to how, in Catalonia, 
immigrants achieve a comparatively high level of effective proficiency 
in the two official languages. A recent survey with data from 2010 
shows that 40% within the population segment composed of those 
born abroad have learnt to speak Catalan (fundacc 2011). The figure 
can be considered rather impressive, if we take into account the 
linguistic background of the many immigrants from Latin America, and 
the lingua franca qualities of Castilian, which is spoken by virtually all 
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Catalan citizens and serves as the vehicle of communication not only 
between Catalonia and Spain, but also between Catalonia and other 
parts of the world. The lingua franca role that English has in Finland 
is replicated to a considerable extent by Spanish in the Catalan case. 
Thus, the capacity of cultural penetration into allophone communities 
(including the Spanish speaking groups) exhibited by Catalan 
must be related to the weight this language carries as a symbol of 
political identification.
 As in Finland, multilingualism in Catalonia is a phenomenon to 
stay. It becomes manifest in varying combinations of “endogenous” 
and “exogenous” languages. On the “exogenous” side, English has 
to be added as an increasingly significant factor: an ever growing 
number of Catalans uses the emergent European lingua franca as 
their main external communication tool.
6 Citizenization as multilingualism
By connecting the effects of the “new” heterogeneity and “old” 
cultural cleavages in particularly intricate ways, cities like Barcelona 
and Helsinki offer laboratory-like qualities for studying what trans-
nationalism represents in environments where national identities of 
different types are still powerful forces (Calhoun 2007). The politics 
of multilingualism demonstrates how the national is “transnational-
ized”: think, for instance, of the multiple ways of relating established 
ethnolinguistic patterns of identification – Finnish versus Swedish, 
Catalan versus Castilian – to the new cultural and communicative 
practices introduced by immigrant groups. In a parallel way, the poli-
tics of multilingualism is a politics that nationalizes the transnational: 
in the referendums on independence organized in a great number of 
Catalan municipalities by civil society actors between autumn 2009 
and spring 2011, mobilizing (in Catalan) for immigrant participation 
was a strategic goal shared by all convoking local entities. Although 
the “hybridization” that is often associated with the dynamics of 
immigration may well change the parameters of identity politics, it 
apparently does not entail the waning of all cultural identities in a 
cosmopolitan pastiche of sorts.
 What comes to the fore with the new heterogeneity in the settings 
of Barcelona and Helsinki is not just an exuberance of diversity, in the 
sense of a ubiquitous proliferation of interlocking, complementary, 
or interchangeable cultural and linguistic attachments. As we have 
seen, institutional attempts at coming to grips with the challenges 
of multilingualism rather involve a delicate exercise in defining the 
proper space for acquiring and using different linguistic compe-
tences. At the individual level, the situation to tackle may not be less 
demanding. To give one concrete example: the children of Moroccan 
immigrants with a Berber background in Barcelona will have to make 
substantial efforts to acquire a linguistic repertoire that “fully” cor-
responds to their equally multinational as transnational environment. 
Such a repertoire would have to include Catalan, Spanish, Amazig, 
and Arabic, as well as ultimately English. This type of situation takes 
us far away from the one nation – one language – one state approach 
that was characteristic of the high time of European modernity. In 
cities like Helsinki and Barcelona, multilingualism and its politics are 
prime examples of the challenges posed by complex diversity. The 
concept underlines the multi-dimensionality and fluidity that diversity 
has attained in our societies. Its use may therefore help us to avoid 
essentializing simplifications when we talk about culture and identity. 
Yet, at the same time, the concept of complex diversity also renders 
tribute to the relevance culturally embedded contexts of praxis – such 
as languages – continue bearing for articulating a reflective identity 
politics.24 To the extent that the approach sketched out here holds, 
we may conclude that the situation in multilingual cities such as 
those discussed here is possibly more instructive for grasping the 
intricacies connected to the politics of diversity and transnationalism 
than the scenery offered by the somewhat stereotypical global urban 
settings of London, New York, or Toronto, where the link between 
the local and the global realms is “naturally” established in English. 
Thus, our bringing complex diversity and multilingualism into focus 
ultimately confirms the old wisdom that “far away from where it’s at is 
where it’s at”.
 How shall we tackle the challenges that multilingualism entails 
for urban politics? Where can we look for the foundations of a nor-
mative approach to the new heterogeneity that is both open to the 
legitimate articulation of diversity and able to overcome the risks of 
fragmentation? The first suggestion I would like to make in these final 
paragraphs is that the normative basis for formulating an appropriate 
political strategy for the multilingual city is recognition. Obviously, 
recognition here means primarily recognizing linguistic diversity. The 
very core of the potential to act as a citizen – be it in ancient Athens, 
in Renaissance Florence, or contemporary European cities – is 
formed by communicative resources. Citizens need to be equipped 
with such resources to be able to act in autonomous and enlight-
ened ways, to participate in collective deliberation, and to influence 
decision-making, locally, nationally, and transnationally. Our freedom 
as citizens is constituted through specific social practices, which 
by definition are linguistically embedded. Multilingual cities must 
be sensitive to this embeddedness and recognize the importance 
language has for the constitution of the personal/social identities of 
their inhabitants. They should formulate a responsive approach when 
it comes to dealing with the particular needs of persons with diverse 
linguistic backgrounds in schools or in the organization of their public 
services.
 In the end, the “politics of recognition” (Taylor 1992) is built on 
the evidence that the cognitive components of civic identities cannot 
be taken as something uniformly given. To overcome both cognitive 
and normative monism, we have to question the idea that there is one 
standard curriculum that will do for all equally and evenly, irrespective 
of their socio-cultural background. Hence, and this is my second 
observation, “citizenization” (Tully 2008: 310–314) and its institutional 
regulation must be regarded as a fundamental aspect of articulating 
a framework for political participation that is compatible with complex 
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diversity. In view of the linguistic embeddedness of civic identities, the 
worth of languages reaches far beyond their instrumental functions. 
By just political standards, cities concerned with how to confront a 
diverse citizenry should open up to introduce varying combinations 
of a multilingual repertoire at the level of their institutions.
 Recognition must not be taken as a means for segregating 
different groups according to their cultural attributes; nor has it to be 
conceived of as a principle thrown out to please group narcissisms 
camouflaged behind a multicultural rhetoric. In the sense that the 
concept is given in these brief normative considerations, recognition 
aims at working out an approach for dealing with the challenges 
of diversity that is primarily inspired by democratic motives. The 
openness of institutions for the articulation of different identities is 
meant, in the end, to be conducive to the creation of a shared civic 
space, which both respects and transcends diversity. Seen in this 
light, recognition becomes indeed the very precondition for sustain-
ing processes of citizenization in contexts of urban diversity. This 
is so because recognizing different cultural and linguistic identities 
is not just a legitimate end in itself, but a decisive step for creat-
ing reciprocal attachments among those supposed to participate in 
the making of a vibrant public culture, a culture that will imply some 
common standards, including linguistic standards. However, it has 
to be emphasized that such standards must be developed without 
replicating the homogenizing logic that characterized the model of 
the European nation-state.
 It should have become evident that in the framework of this 
article the concept of citizenship is used in its most literal sense: that 
is, citizens are people living in cities, and citizenization, accordingly, 
means to learn to be aware of the social and political implications of 
living together in a city. To the extent that cities are spaces made of 
difference, this awareness must include the realm of linguistic and 
cultural diversity. From such an angle, the dynamics of citizenization 
in our present urban contexts ultimately demand a further institutional 
uncoupling of citizenship rights and entitlements stemming from na-
tionality. Eventually, the multilingual city may turn out to be the central 
site for establishing a more substantial citizenship regime in Europe, 
a regime that will combine a tolerant attitude towards the articulation 
of diversity in an interdependent world with the noble democratic goal 
of creating and reproducing a common public space.
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Notes
1 In the last few years, these questions have indeed increas-
ingly become a more salient issue in the political debates on 
integration, naturalization, and citizenship in several European 
countries, irrespective of their particular trajectories in the field 
of immigration. For an overview of issues related to immigration 
and urban multilingualism in Europe see Extra and Yağmur 
(2004).
2 The medievalist Patrick J. Geary (2001: 40) observes: “[I]n the 
great cities of Europe (…) linguistic and cultural stratification 
once more characterizes both ends of the population’s spec-
trum. At the top, major multinational corporations and scientific 
institutions operate largely in English with little regard for local 
language traditions. At the lower end of the social scale, these 
cities have experienced substantial growth in the numbers of 
people who trace their origins to Turkey, North Africa, the Indian 
subcontinent, and other parts of Asia. These immigrants live 
their lives speaking Arabic, Turkish, and other languages distant 
from those spoken by the Middle Class. These developments, 
which are greeted by hostility and fear as novel occurrences, 
are actually a return to a much more ancient pattern of ethnic 
diversity. Europe is indeed beginning once more to resemble its 
past.”
3 At any rate, this is a conclusion one can draw when 
extrapolating from the analysis of language maintenance in the 
US (Fishman 1980).
4 See the assessment of the dynamics of transnationalization 
in Faist (2004).
5 The interplay of old and new layers of heterogeneity in Brussels 
is discussed by Favell and Martiniello (1999).
6 McRae (1999: 55–82) gives a thorough overview of the impact 
of the linguistic cleavage on political developments in indepen-
dent Finland.




8 Tilastokeskus (Statistics Finland). Available from: <http://
pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak_en.asp>. 
[Last accessed 9.4.2011].
9 Grönlund (2011) offers an updated picture of the positioning of 
the Finland-Swedes in Finnish politics.
10 Tilastokeskus (Statistics Finland). Available from: <http://www.
stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html>. [Last accessed 
9.4.2011].
11 See Vertovec (2009: 69–74) on types of socio-cultural compe-
tence linked to transnationalism.
12 Available from: <http://www.hel.fi/hki/opev/en/
Comprehensive+schools/Multicultural+education>. 
 [Last accessed 5.4.2011].
13 For discussions of this backlash from different perspectives see 
Brubaker (2003); Vertovec and Wessendorf (2009).
14 In Swedish speaking schools, the Finnish – Swedish sequence 
is inverted.
15 Pakkoruotsi, as the Finnish phrase has it.
16 See Requejo (2010) for an analysis of the recent turn from 
autonomism to independentism in Catalan politics.
17 Linz (1975) offers a thorough examination of the linguistic 
dimension of center – periphery conflicts in modern Spain.
18 The term used in the survey is llengua inicial; 3.8% indicate 
both Catalan and Castilian, 2.6% Arabic, 6.7% other languages 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 43). From 2001 to 2008, the 
Catalan population increased by 16.75%, basically as a con-
sequence of immigration. In 2008, the number of residents in 
Catalonia born abroad (i.e. outside of Spain) was 1,204,711 
(16.4%). The migration cycle has come to a halt since then, so 
that demographic figures have only changed moderately.
19 The metropolitan area includes both the city of Barcelona and 
its densely populated suburbs.
20 For the figures, see Ajuntament de Barcelona (2010: 11, 25).
21 See Annex 2 (Protocol for extracurricular classes in foreign 
pupils’ languages and cultures of origin) to the Language and 
social cohesion plan introduced in 2007 by the Departament 
d’Educació. Available from: <http://www.xtec.cat/lic/intro/docu-
menta/annex2_extracurricularclasses.pdf>.
22 Arabic leads the ranking, with 1,682 pupils. It is followed by 
Chinese (501), Portuguese (227) and Romanian (177). The 
list also includes Amazig/Berber (98) and Bengali (57). See 
Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d’Ensenyament, Servei 
de Llengües: Llengües d’origen. Presentació. Available from: 
<http://blocs.xtec.cat/llenguadorigen/presentacio/> [Last ac-
cessed 30.3.2011].
23 With its 1,620,000 inhabitants (2010), the city of Barcelona 
makes up approximately 22% of the Catalan population.
24 A systematic elaboration of the concept of complex diversity can 
be found in Kraus (forthcoming).
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